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Using data from a survey of Bangladeshi households, this paper investigates the link 
between female status and food security. Employing three different indicators of female 
status – husband’s and wife’s assets brought at marriage, female share of household 
income and a composite index of women empowerment, the paper finds evidence of 
women’s status influencing food security. By raising the level of food security for some 
disadvantaged women’s groups female status is also found to be instrumental in 
mitigating the extent of gender-based within-household discrimination. The findings 
reveal that inferences drawn about food security by observing the changes in various 
non-food budget shares could be misleading or overemphasized. 
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1 Introduction 
Food security means ‘[A]ccess by all people at all times to enough food for an active 
and healthy life. Food security includes at a minimum: (1) the ready availability 
of nutritionally adequate and safe foods, and (2) an assured ability to acquire acceptable 
foods in socially acceptable ways (for example, without resorting to emergency food 
supplies, scavenging, stealing, or other coping strategies)’.1 Lack of food security is 
generally thought to be linked to insufficient household resources. This notion rules  
out the possibility of uneven levels of food security amongst individual members within 
a household. However, there is a large body of evidence to suggest that, by influencing 
household decisions, intra-household relations have significant bearings upon 
households’ resource allocation in different activities and welfare of individual 
members. This in essence would imply that the allocation of household resources on 
different goods (including food items) and services as well as their distribution amongst 
members would at least be partly influenced by intra-household resource allocation 
mechanism. Therefore, it has often been contemplated that a change in the intra-
household decision making mechanism will change the distributional outcomes, and 
particularly women’s greater role in decision-making is considered to be a determinant 
of these changes. Since in a patriarchy like Bangladesh, the resource allocating 
decisions are usually undertaken by males, improved women’s status may alter the 
household behaviour in this regard. But will this shift in within-household decision 
making power influence the household resource allocating outcomes in a way to 
improve food security? This is the question that has been attempted to answer in this 
paper. 
Examining the link between female’s within-household status and food security will 
require one to look into the intra-household resource allocation behaviour. In 
economics, there are contrasting suppositions with reference to household members’ 
resource sharing out behaviour. The unitary or common preference model, credited to 
Becker (1965, 1981), assumes a single preference for each household irrespective of the 
number, and gender and sex composition of members the family embodies. The 
collective model, by contrast, acknowledges the existence of multiple decision makers, 
and consequently the resource share reflects the relative bargaining power of the 
individual. Following the common preference model, intra-household distribution is 
unaltered by changes in women’s status. On the contrary, in the collective models intra-
household allocation is an outcome of bargaining, which thus recognizes the role of 
women’s status. Testing the validity of the unitary and collective models and the 
subsequent implications for intra-household resource allocation has been documented 
by a growing body of literature.  
The evidence emerging out of a very large number of studies on the whole seems to 
suggest that women’s control over resources may imply more resources allocated to 
basic needs (such as food), and children, contributing to children’s well-being. These 
studies have been undertaken under many different contexts. Therefore, while in the UK 
a policy change transferring child allowances to mothers is shown to have had the 
impact of raising the expenditure on children’s clothing relative to that of fathers 
(Lundberg et al. 1997), in Brazil an increase in mothers’ unearned income is found to 
                                                 
1  This definition was published in 1990 by the Life Sciences Research Office (LSRO) of the 
Federation of Americal Societies for Experimental Biology (cited in Bickel et al. 2000).   2
have a higher positive influence on family health outcomes including the child survival 
probabilities, when compared to the effect of a rise in the same income due to fathers 
(Thomas 1990, 1996). Similarly, the studies by von Braun et al. (1991), Handa (1996), 
Schultz (1990), Doan and Bisharat (1990), and Castle (1995) have shown the 
importance of mothers’ status for their children’s nutritional status in Rwanda, Jamaica, 
Thailand, Jordan and Malawi, respectively. Using micro data from a big sample of 
Taiwanese households, Thomas and Chen (1993) find the significant impact of 
women’s income share, both earned as well as non-earned, on the family budget 
allocated to staples, alcohol, cigarettes, and education, which is also confirmed by 
Hoddinott and Haddad’s (1995) results from the Côte d’Ivoire. For the Philippines, 
Garcia (1991) offers the evidence of female income share being positively and 
significantly associated with household-level calorie availability and preschoolers’ 
weight-for-age, and negatively with the probability of preschooler’s suffering from such 
diseases as fever and diarrhea. For Guatemala, Engle (1991) reveals significant positive 
relationship between the mother’s share of family earnings and children’s health status 
as measured by height-for-age, weight-for-age, and weight-for-height. For Pakistan, 
Guha-Khasnobis and Hazarika (2005) analyse the impact that women’s within-
household status have upon children’s food security and reveal a positive association. 
By comparing the gender of household heads, studies have also found evidence to draw 
inference about female headed households’ better food security status. For example, 
Levin et al. (1999) show that female-headed households are spending more on basic 
goods, particularly food and health services and less on leisure, which is again 
corroborated by Lloyd and Gage-Brandon’s (1993) finding of households with a woman 
as the primary head to spend the highest on food consumption. 
In the context of Bangladesh as well, there is evidence of women’s status playing an 
important role in the composition of household expenditures and health outcomes of 
children. While Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003) find the relative bargaining power of 
women in Bangladeshi households having significantly different impacts on different 
types of expenditure, Quisumbing and Brière (2000) observe a greater propensity of 
allocation in favour of children’s clothing and education out of the resources controlled 
by women.2 Turning to children’s health outcomes, Pitt and Khandaker (1998) and 
Khandaker et al. (2003) show that the increased resources in the hands of women, due 
to borrowing from the non-government organizations (NGOs), contribute to improving 
the anthropometric measures for children. 
Despite the above evidence, the relationship between women’s status including greater 
control over resources and overall household food security has not been studied 
unswervingly and convincingly. Better anthropometric measures of children may not 
represent overall food security as children’s improved welfare can be achieved at 
others’, particularly of adult women’s, costs. On the other hand, drawing inferences on 
the basis of an association between women’s status and household food consumption 
expenditures can be misleading because of two main reasons. First, when the nature of 
distribution within the household is not known, food expenditure data cannot provide 
food security of individuals. And, second, food consumption expenditure data cannot 
take into account the possibility of substitution of relatively expensive foods with low 
                                                 
2  Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003) also provide similar evidence from three other countries, namely 
Ethiopia, Indonesia, and South Africa.   3
energy content (such as meat and fish) for relatively inexpensive food with high energy 
content (such as rice), leading to over-assessment of calorie-intake and food security 
situation. In addition, calories, which are generally used as a proxy for food security, 
derived from food expenditures fail to make a distinction between calorie availability 
and actual calorie intake by household members. There can be substantial wastages, 
either because of cooking and eating practices or because of the nature of the food 
items, and leakages, which can result from, inter alia, hosting guests and giving away 
foods to others.3 
In this backdrop, the main objective of this paper is to explore the relationship between 
food security and female status by considering individual household members’ 
characteristics and their food consumption. More precisely, measured by the calorie 
adequacy ratio (CAR), which is computed for individual household members, 
considering their calorie requirements arising from physical characteristics (such as 
weight and height) and the level of physical activity vis-à-vis actual calorie intake, food 
security is correlated with several indicators of women’s status. This is made possible 
by making use of a specialized survey data on Bangladesh that provides information on 
actual food intake, anthropometric measures, and time allocation to different types of 
activities by every household member. As calorie adequacy focuses only on the quantity 
aspect of food sufficiency ignoring the ‘quality’ of the diet (for example, see Levin et al. 
1999), an attempt is also made to study the relationship between women’s status and the 
quality of household diet. In addition, the food security issue is also analysed by 
capturing the effect of women’s status on the household budget share of food, addictive 
goods and eating-out behaviour. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
describes the methodology and the data; Section 3 presents the regression results, while 
Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2  Methodology and data 
The basic approach in this paper is to correlate the various measures of food security 
with a number of indicators representing women’s within household status, controlling 
for other factors through the multivariate regression analyses. For making this possible, 
the most important tasks at the outset are to define and construct the indicators of food 
security and women’s status.  
Let us first consider food security. As mentioned above, food security at the individual 
level is to be measured by the individual-specific calorie adequacy ratio (CARi), which 
is the proportion of energy requirement that is met by the individual. There are two 
broad components of energy requirement, namely (1) the resting energy need which is 
the energy expended at rest and (2) energy need due to physical activities. Both types of 
energy requirements depend on individual specific characteristics such as age, sex, body 
weight and composition, and the nature of physical activities performed. WHO (1985) 
has developed a set of equations based on which the resting energy expenditure (REE) 
                                                 
3  This is a serious concern given that the relationship between household expenditures and calories has 
been a subject matter of intense controversy in the empirical literature with the corresponding elasticity 
estimates varying wildly: from zero to greater than one (Bouis and Haddad 1992; Strauss and Thomas 
1995).    4
needs of individuals of different age and sex groups can be predicted (see Annex 2).4 
Obtaining energy requirements due to physical activities, on the other hand, is a much 
more involved task. Energy-intensities associated with different activities differ widely 
and the energy need of a particular type of activity is to be an increasing function of 
time allocated to it. As different types of activities are performed by individuals 
throughout each day, the consequent activities related-energy requirement will 
necessitate some measure of energy intensity of all activities performed and on time 
allocated to each one of them. To keep things tractable, following NRC (1989), all 
activities can be classified into four broad categories, namely, very light, light, moderate 
and heavy, and it will then be possible to compare energy expenditures due to these 
different activity types with REE. Therefore, calorie requirements for sustaining such 
sedentary activities like sleeping, eating and drinking can be treated same as REE, while 
given the guideline in NRC (1989) heavy physical works like earth digging may imply 
energy expenditure as much as seven times of resting time. Given all the four activities 
in which individuals are involved in, a weighted energy requirement index can be 
constructed in relation to REE, where the actual time spent on different activity-types 
will be considered as weights.5 
As against the energy requirement, the data on energy intake is to be available from all 
foods (including drinks), individuals consume during a day. Different types of food 
have different calorie contents, which are energy sources. Ingredients such as cooking 
oils and spices added during cooking also affect calorie content in prepared meals. As a 
result, when the information on all ingredients used in preparing meals and the actual 
measure of consumption by the individuals is available, the individual-specific calorie 
intake can be computed. Under usual circumstances, calorie intakes lower than the 
energy requirements should imply inadequate food security for individuals.6 
An argument that is often put forward against the calorie approach is that it cannot make 
distinction between ordinary and preferred food items. Some relatively inexpensive 
foods such as cereals although are rich in calories, they are not necessarily the most 
preferred items. In the context of Bangladesh, because of taste and desirability food 
items such as fish, egg, meat and sugar and sugar-content items are usually considered 
as good/preferred foods despite their relatively low calorie content, particularly in 
comparison with cereals. As a result, there might be a tendency of substituting good 
foods for cereals. To take this into consideration, the ratio of calories from good food to 
total calories consumed can be worked out both for individuals and households provided 
that information on actual food consumption by individuals is available. 
While assessing the food security, a common practice in the literature has been to 
analyse various budget shares of the household and to observe the impact of female 
status on them. Following this strand, three different budget shares of the household, 
                                                 
4  REE specifications rely on sex, age and weight of individuals. These specifications can allow for 
normal growth requirements of children along with their maintenance of physical health given the 
activity level. Additional allowances are also added for pregnant and lactating women.  
5  Annex I describes the approximate energy requirement from different types of activities following 
the guideline as provided in NRC (1989). 
6  Usual circumstances would include, inter alia, individuals not suffering from illness affecting his 
normal eating behaviour and deliberate attempts to reduce calorie intake.    5
that is, the shares of food, addictive goods and eating-out are also analysed in this paper. 
When the share of food budget increases while that of addictive goods declines, an 
improvement in food security is generally recognized.7 The relevance of eating out to 
food security is probably not straightforward as in low income countries such necessity 
is mostly associated with people who work outside home. However, the outside-home 
foods consumed are likely to differ from the in-house meals prepared given that outside 
home consumption has a clear bias towards preferred and relatively expensive food 
items. The mere necessity of the individuals working outside home cannot probably 
justify the consumption of preferred food items at much bigger quantities than their 
availability in-house consumption. As a ‘fair’ allocation of household resources requires 
individuals taking as much a share of preferred food items as he/she would have 
received within the household, a more than proportionate consumption of preferred 
foods while eating outside home entails a foregone opportunity to raise the household’s 
total energy (calorie) available for allocation. Given the labour market characteristics in 
a developing and conservative setting like Bangladesh, where women’s outside home 
work is considered to be of secondary importance, males are likely to constitute the 
overwhelming portion of the eating-out population. Again, males command greater 
control over household resources and play the leading role in household decision 
making process. Consequently, resource allocation in a way that satisfies their desire for 
better foods through eating-out, even at the cost of better nourishment of other 
household members, can be a direct outcome of the patriarchal norms. Whether 
improved female status restrains such behaviour would therefore be of great interest.8 
Turning to women’s status, one significant problem is the difficulty associated with 
measuring it precisely. In the absence of any concrete methodology and/or indicators, 
different proxy measures are used to reflect women’s bargaining power or relative 
position. These include the share of women’s income (either earned or non-earned or 
both) in total household income, and possession of current assets, and assets brought at 
marriage (Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003). The search for a suitable indicator of the 
relative bargaining power was catapulted into prominence in the backdrop of a growing 
interest in testing the empirical validity of the unitary versus collective models of intra-
household resource allocation. As Quisumbing and Brière (2000) have elucidated, none 
of the indicators are free from limitations. Labour income reflects time allocation and 
labour force participation, both of which may be the outcome of intra-household 
bargaining, while non-labour/unearned/non-wage income is not independent of tastes 
and labour market conditions when pensions, unemployment benefits and earnings from 
asset accumulation generate much of it. In addition, while searching for the appropriate 
bargaining power proxy, apart from the exogeneity of the variable (with regard to the 
                                                 
7  The budget share of food can be computed as the total monthly food expenditure of a household as a 
proportion of total monthly expenditure of that household. In the context of Bangladeshi households, 
addictive goods generally include cigarettes/bidis (used for smoking), betel leaf and nuts, and dried 
tobacco leaves along with alcoholic drinks and drugs in other cases. Hence, the budget share of 
addictive goods in total household expenditure is to be calculated as the combined monthly 
expenditure made on all these items as proportion of the total household monthly expenditure. 
8  By summing together the expenses related to individual members’ outside home food consumption 
and dividing it by the total monthly household expenditure, the budget share of eating-out can be 
determined. If female status is to contribute to household food security, the proportion of household 
budget allocated to eating out is expected to fall with the improvement in women’s status.    6
within-marriage bargaining), one must also consider the ‘cultural relevance’ of the 
indicator (Quisumbing and Brière 2000).9 
Despite their inherent limitations, following the empirical literature, three different 
indicators of women’s empowerment have been used in this paper.10 In the first of these 
cases, assets brought at marriage are considered as the measure of the relative 
bargaining power.11 The second measure of female status that is used is the female 
share of household income.12 Finally, apart from the relative bargaining power, a 
measure of absolute status of women, using a methodology as employed in Hashemi 
et al. (1996), is also used. Under this methodology women’s status is assessed by taking 
into consideration a number of factors, for example, if they can take decisions, make 
purchases themselves, enjoy mobility, have some political awareness and are subject to 
abusive behaviour from husbands and in-laws. Several specific questions help assess 
their empowerment status, which are then summed together by assigning specific values 
to the types of answers received. Therefore, in this particular case the female status is 
proxied by a constructed woman empowerment index. 
This paper takes advantage of a unique survey of Bangladeshi households, with a 
special emphasis on intra-household issues, which was conducted by the Bureau of 
Economic Research (BER) at Dhaka University under one of its research projects titled, 
‘Capturing Intra-Household Distribution and Poverty Incidence: A Study on 
Bangladesh’. The survey, administered during November 2004–February 2005, covered 
1,039 households in Bangladesh, of which about 70 per cent of households were located 
in rural areas while the rest belonged to the urban communities. Like any other 
household surveys, the BER survey collected data on a wide variety of subjects, 
including household characteristics (such as age and sex of household head, location of 
residence, ownership of assets, exposure to natural calamities and coping practices, 
etc.), educational attainment, health endowment (as reflected in height and weight), 
economic activities of individual household members, and consumption expenditures on 
food and non-food items. Nevertheless, the survey possesses, as described below, 
several unique features, which make it possible to construct the indicators of food 
security and women’s status discussed above. 
First, unlike the most widely used technique of obtaining information on consumption 
through the ‘recall method’, the BER survey, by using specially trained enumerators, 
recorded the actual individual specific dietary intake by directly weighing the 
consumption of food items by individual members. To reduce the measurement errors 
associated with recording of food intake, and to minimize the problem of distorted food 
                                                 
9  Usually the practice has been to use the proxies for bargaining power as the indicator of female 
status. That is, no distinction is made between bargaining power and female status. 
10  The reason for choosing these particular indicators is their availability in the database that has been 
used for the empirical exercises in this paper. 
11  This indicator, however, would not be exogenous to the decisions made within marriage. For 
instance, educational attainments of the partners will affect both marital assets and decision made 
within marriage (Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003). 
12 Both earned and unearned incomes have been used while constructing this indicator of 
empowerment. Note that, as Hoddinot and Haddad (1995) and Guha-Khasnobis and Hazarika (2005) 
have pointed out, both earned and unearned incomes are not exogenous in all instances.   7
intake behaviour due to the presence of enumerators, data on dietary intake of members 
for each household was collected for three days during the survey period. The food 
preparation techniques were also keenly observed and all the ingredients used during 
cooking were recorded to work out the food nutrients intake by individual members. 
Apart from measuring the food consumption, the survey also considered the amount of 
food sent outside home and plate wastes in order not to overestimate the food intake. 
Another important feature of the survey was to record the time spent by individual 
household members on different types of activities. A ‘24-hour time allocation chart’ on 
individual members was filled in for three days using a combination of participatory and 
recall method of data collection. A large number of activities were listed in the chart so 
that the energy-intensities associated with different activities could be linked closely to 
the NRC (1989) guideline. 
Given the nature of the survey, it was possible to compute the individual-specific actual 
calorie intake. To work out the calorie requirement of individuals, first the REE was 
calculated using the methodology described in WHO (1985), for which the information 
on height and weight of individuals from the BER dataset had to be exploited. For 
determining the energy need resulting from the physical activities performed, the record 
of individuals’ activities was used in classifying the activities in terms of their 
intensities relative to REE, as suggested in NRC (1989), which were then weighted by 
the time spent on each of them and summed across the activity groups. Since the calorie 
intake and requirement were determined as the individual level, the corresponding 
information at the household level could be easily obtained by aggregating the 
respective figures for household members.  
The BER dataset also allows one to take into account the quality of diet as the data on 
individual members’ consumption of each item and their quantity are available. Based 
on the literature and our knowledge of Bangladeshi households, certain items such as 
fish, meat, dairy products, and sugary products were identified as good foods on a priori 
basis and then the ratio of calories taken from good foods to total intake was computed. 
The corresponding household level variable, i.e., the calories from preferred foods to 
total calories consumed, could be constructed using these individual level variables. 
The BER survey had detailed information regarding the household expenditure pattern, 
both food and nonfood. The households on average were spending 54 per cent of their 
monthly expenditure for foods. For an average household a mere 7 per cent of the total 
calories are generated by good food items like meat, fish, eggs, etc. Turning to addictive 
consumption, more than 75 per cent of the surveyed households reported the existence 
of some kind of such expenditure. The data reveal that households in the lowest 10 
percentile of per capita expenditure have a mean per capita daily calorie intake of 1,679, 
which in the absence of any addictive consumption could have increased by another 
73 Kcal.13 For households with higher per capita food expenditure the amounts of 
calorie foregone are even larger.14 Nearly 53 per cent of the households are found to 
                                                 
13  According to one yardstick used in assessing poverty in Bangladesh, the households with less than 
daily per capita calorie consumption of 1,805 Kcal are the extreme poor households. Therefore, even for 
this group of households there exist some significant addictive consumption expenditures.  
14  For households with the monthly per capita food expenditure in 10-25 percentile, 25-50 percentile, 
50-75 percentile, 75-90 percentile and above 90 percentile the calorie forgone per capita due to the 
consumption of addictive goods are 75 Kcal, 81 Kcal, 94 Kcal, 138 Kcal and 176 Kcal respectively.    8
have at least one smoker member and 94 per cent of the smokers are males. Amongst 
the betel leaf consumers the male-female distribution is more even; 54 per cent are 
males while the remaining 46 per cent are females. When both cigarette and betel-leaf 
are considered, the consumption of addictive goods is dominated by males.  
The survey also provided information about the eating out practice. According to the 
data the average unit price of in-house calorie is less than the average unit price of 
outside-the-home calorie. To illustrate this a little further, for households in the lowest 
10 percentile of monthly per capita food expenditure, the price of 1,000 ‘in-house 
calorie’ is 15.80 taka and the price of 1,000 ‘eating-out calorie’ is 48.75 taka. For 
households in the highest 10 percentile of monthly per capita food expenditure the 
corresponding figures are 28.22 taka and 82.49 taka respectively. Also, preliminary 
investigations reveal that regardless of the level of monthly food expenditure, 
individuals take good food in a higher proportion when they eat out.15 At higher levels 
of ‘eating out expenditure’, the proportion of male consumer is larger, suggesting that 
males greater eating out practices involve more expensive food intake. If individuals 
could spend the ‘eating out expenditure’ to raise their within-house food consumption, 
they would have experienced a boost in their in-house calorie level. The average amount 
of calorie forgone due to eating out ranges from 9.93 Kcal (0.81 per cent of daily in-
house calorie) for households with monthly per capita food expenditure in the lowest 10 
percentile to 481.10 Kcal (18.70 per cent of daily in-house calorie) for households with 
monthly per capita food expenditure in the highest 10 percentile. Also the average 
amount of calorie forgone owing to dining off the home rises with the household’s food 
expenditure level. 
Yet another interesting dimension of the BER survey was to gather very detailed 
information on married women within the households in order to assess their relative 
status, as reflected in a number of socioeconomic and cultural aspects. All data 
corresponding to individual women’s off-home income-earning works, within 
household income earning activities, ability to make decisions on a wide variety of 
matters, assets brought at marriage, other unearned income, being subject to domestic 
violence, etc. were recorded by following a quasi-participatory approach to information 
gathering. From these data it was possible to construct a composite index of women 
empowerment, as explained in Annex 2.  
3 Estimation  and  results 
The household calorie adequacy ratio (CARhh) and the household good food availability 
ratio (GFhh) are explained using a number of household attributes like income, 
household size, head’s sex, within household demographic composition, location of the 
household (i.e. whether in rural or urban areas), and female status. The same set of 
household characteristics is also used while explaining the various budget shares (i.e. of 
food, addictive goods and eating out). In addition to household level assessment, given 
the availability of data, three individual level regressions are also run to explain (i) the 
individual calorie adequacy ratio (CARi), (ii) individual good food share (GFi) and 
                                                 
15  For instance, for households with monthly per capita expenditure in the highest 10 percentile, 18 per 
cent of the foods consumed at home were good foods while for the same group of households 52 per cent 
of the foods consumed outside the home were good foods.   9
(iii) individual-specific  monthly food expenditure (FEi) using the corresponding 
household level attributes as mentioned above, individual level characteristics such as 
age and physical activity, female status indicator and interactions between female status 
and demographic groups.16  
Instead of using income as the measure of household command over resources, the 
regressions eventually make use of household expenditure since the latter is often 
regarded as a more reliable measure of households’ permanent income.17 However, 
considering expenditure as a determinant of calorie and food availability could lead to 
endogeneity problem. This problem is addressed by instrumenting the per capita 
expenditure variable on a set of its determinants including household landholding, 
household head’s age, household head’s education, household size, sex of the household 
head, location and prices of a number of important food items.18 Annex Table A1 
provides the results of the instrumenting regression from which the predicted value of 
household expenditure is retained to be used in the specification showing the 
relationship between food security and women’s status.19 In the following, the results of 
the regression analyses have been reported under the three different indicators of 
women’s status used. 
3.1  Asset brought at marriage20 
A problem with using marital assets as proxy of bargaining power is that both husband’s 
and wife’s resources brought at marriage are likely to be correlated with some 
unobserved characteristics that influence resource allocation or the quantity of assets 
brought and thus could be endogenous to the marriage market selection process. 
Therefore, we instrument husband’s and wife’s assets at marriage using their individual 
and family characteristics and also taking into account some characteristics of the 
                                                 
16 For the demographic composition, 10 age-sex categories have been defined, namely, male 
preschoolers, female preschoolers, male schoolers, female schoolers, male young adults, female young 
adults, male prime age adults, female prime age adults, male elderly and female elderly. Preschooler are 
aged not more than 6 years, schoolers are aged between 7 to 14 years, young age adults are people in the 
15-24 age group, prime age adults are aged between 25 and 59 years and elderly people are those with age 
exceeding 59 years. 
17  Current income is more volatile than current expenditure and that the covariance between current 
income and food consumption is thought to be lower than permanent income and food consumption. 
Also, for poorer households in developing countries, reporting income is perhaps much more difficult 
than reporting expenditures.  
18  Since in a typical monthly expenditure of the basket of a Bangladeshi household various food 
expenditures constitute the lion’s share, we also include the prices of a number of food items. The prices 
considered are those of rice, wheat, fish, egg, meat, sugar and pulse. 
19  The instrumenting regression turns out to be quite satisfactory. The household monthly per capita 
expenditure is found to rise significantly with household landholding and household head’s education, 
while it bears an inverse relationship with household size. The location (rural/urban) of the household is 
also an important factor, as for urban households the expenditure is significantly higher. A number of 
food prices also appear to be important determinants. 
20  For a woman dowry is a subset of her assets at marriage.   10
spouse.21 The relevant regressions are presented in Annex Table A2, from which the 
predicted values of assets brought by husbands and wives are used in assessing the 
effects on food security. 
Table 1: Impacts of assets at marriage on household calorie adequacy ratio and household 
good food share: 2SLS estimates 
Dependent variable  Household calorie 
adequacy ratio (CARhh) 
Household good food 
share (GFhh) 
Variables   Coefficient  Coefficient 










Household head’s sex (male = 1)  -0.026 (0.022)  -0.009
** (0.004)
 
Male schoolers in the household (ratio)   -0.060 (0.078)  -0.032
** (0.015)
 
Male young adults in the household (ratio)   -0.018 (0.067)  0.009 (0.015) 
Male prime age adults in the household (ratio)   -0.125 (0.086)  0.017 (0.018) 
Male elderly in the household (ratio)   0.162 (0.104)  0.028 (0.022) 
Female preschoolers in the household (ratio)   0.118 (0.086)  -0.021 (0.016) 
Female schoolers in the household (ratio)   -0.116 (0.076)  0.002 (0.017) 
Female young adults in the household (ratio)   0.059 (0.078)  0.001 (0.016) 
Female prime age adults in the household (ratio)   0.072 (0.081)  0.009 (0.017) 
Female elderly in the household (ratio)   0.327
*** (0.109)
  -0.001 (0.020) 
Ln (wife’s asset brought at marriage), predicted  -0.006 (0.019)  0.007
** (0.003)
 
Ln (husband’s asset brought at marriage), predicted  0.002 (0.014)  0.005
** (0.002)
 










R-squared 0.0615  0.1386 
F-statistics of restriction     
Wife’s asset brought at marriage = husband’s asset 
brought at marriage 
0.07 0.18 
 




Drawn inferences are based on robust standard errors (given in the parentheses). For the household 
demographic composition of the households, male preschoolers are considered as the base excluded 
category. 
Regression results reported in Table 1 show the empirical relationship between food 
security, as represented by CARhh (column 2) and GFhh (column 3) and husband’s and 
wife’s status as measured by resources brought at marriage. It is found that CARhh is 
significantly and positively influenced by the monthly per capita household expenditure, 
the size of the household, and the ratio of female elderly to household size.22 Neither 
the wife’s nor the husband’s resources exert any important influence on food security. 
                                                 
21 Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003) followed a similar procedure to wipe away the potential 
endogeneity and measurement errors associated with the husband’s and wife’s resources brought at 
marriage. 
22  That is, relative to the excluded category, a higher proportion of female elderly is associated with 
improved food security. The finding is plausible given the lower calorie requirement of elderly females. 
Their lower calorie need is largely explained by their low activity level as well as by low calorie-
absorption capability.    11
Furthermore, the effects of husband’s and wife’s bargaining power do not differ 
markedly as an F-test hypothesizing the equality of the corresponding two coefficients 
could not be rejected.  
Like their effects on household calorie adequacy ratio, both the household expenditure 
and size significantly raise the good food availability ratio, GFhh (column 2, Table 1). 
Household headship also matters for the proportion of household energy generated from 
preferred food items. If the head is a male, GFhh is significantly lowered, which, in turn, 
implies that female heads give more attention to improve the quality of the diet. 
Amongst different household member groups, relative to the base category of male pre-
schoolers, only the male schoolers significantly influence the proportion of calories 
coming from good foods. Turning to our primary interest, it is found that both wife’s 
and husband’s resources are positively associated with the good food availability at the 
household level and the associated impacts are not significantly different from each 
other, as depicted in the corresponding F-test statistic. 
Table 2 reports the results of the budget shares. The food budget share is found to be 
nonlinearly influenced by the household per capita expenditure, as both the level and its 
squared terms are statistically significant (column 3). The overall impact of expenditure, 
considering the coefficients both on the level and square term, is worked out to be 
negative for households with average income.23 Household size also turns out to be a 
statistically significant determinant of food budget share. While the household ratios of 
male young adults and male elderly are found to be positively associated with the 
budget share, the corresponding ratio of female prime age adults is inversely related to 
the budgetary allocation to food. Assets at marriage either by the husband or wife fail to 
register any significant effect and their impacts are not discernibly different from each 
other.  
The budget share of addictive goods is independent of the level of household 
expenditure which is persuasive given the nature of the goods (column 3 in Table 2). 
Apart from household size, the ratio of male elderly in the household raises the budget 
share markedly. Quite strikingly, husband’s asset at marriage is found to be negatively 
associated with the budget share of addictive goods whereas the wife’s asset at marriage 
bears a positive sign (although insignificant).24 Here, too, the restriction of the equality 
of the coefficients associated with husband’s and wife’s bargaining power could not be 
rejected. 
The budget share of eating outside the home appears to be free from any significant 
influence of the expenditure, but rises significantly with the household size and also if 
the household head is a male (column 4 in Table 2). Though both the proxies of 
bargaining power have significant negative impacts, significantly different gender-
specific effects cannot be statistically vindicated. 
                                                 
23  This is because the marginal propensity to food expenditure out of incremental incomes is likely to 
be low. As incomes rise, households tend to spend more on non-food items. 
24  In this analysis addictive goods consist of betel leaves and nuts and bidi/cigarette. Although only in 3 
per cent of the households surveyed, 46 per cent of betel leaf consumers were female, which might result 
in the positive sign on the coefficient of the asset brought by women. Guha-Khasnobis and Hazarika 
(2005), while analysing the relationship between women’s status and children’s food security in Pakistan 
found women’s cash income raising the budget share of adult goods and also the spending on tobacco.    12
Table 2: Different expenditure shares and assets brought at marriage: 2SLS estimates  
Dependent variable  Household budget 
share of food 
Household budget 
share of addictive 
goods 
Household budget 
share of eating outside 
home 
Variables Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient 




  0.345 (0.529)  -1.61 (1.39) 





  -0.022 (0.037)  0.121 (0.097) 







Household head’s sex (male = 1)  0.009 (0.016)  0.001 (0.003)  0.016
** (0.007)
 
Male schoolers in the household 
(ratio)  
0.016 (0.055)  -0.009 (0.013)  -0.062
** (0.027)
 
Male young adults in the 
household (ratio)  
0.217
*** (0.051)
  0.013 (0.013)  -0.038 (0.026) 
Male prime age adults in the 
household (ratio)  
0.058 (0.067)  0.023 (0.015)  -0.014 (0.031) 






  -0.009 (0.039) 
Female preschoolers in the 
household (ratio)  
-0.008 (0.060)  -0.005 (0.015)  0.038 (0.032) 
Female schoolers in the 
household (ratio)  
0.065 (0.056)  -0.014 (0.015)  -0.022 (0.031) 
Female young adults in the 
household (ratio)  
0.068 (0.062)  -0.001 (0.015)  -0.049
* (0.028)
 
Female prime age adults in the 
household (ratio)  
-0.151
** (0.066)
  -0.016 (0.014)  -0.080
*** (0.028)
 
Female elderly in the household 
(ratio)  
-0.109 (0.081)  -0.016 (0.016)  -0.064 (0.042) 
Location (urban = 1)  0.001 (0.016)  0.004 (0.003)  -0.002 (0.007) 
Ln (wife’s asset brought at 
marriage) 
0.003 (0.012)  0.003 (0.002)  -0.013
** (0.005)
 
Ln (husband’s asset brought at 
marriage) 







  -1.35 1.89)  5.52 (4.97) 





R-squared 0.2227  0.0672  0.0611 
F-statistics of restriction       
Wife’s asset brought at marriage 
= husband’s asset brought at 
marriage  
0.09 2.14  0.53 
 




respectively. Drawn inferences are based on robust standard errors (given in the parentheses). 
For the household demographic composition of the households, male preschoolers are 
considered as the base excluded category. 
Regression results for individual level food security as proxied by the individual calorie 
adequacy ratio (CARi) are given in Annex Table A3. CARi is found to be positively and 
significantly influenced by household food security (CARhh), household size and 
household headship (if a male is the head). On the other hand, urban individuals and 
individuals with higher activity level are receiving significantly lower calories, 
normalized by their requirements. Also, relative to the base category, other male age   13
groups are enjoying higher CARs. More importantly and strikingly husband’s marital 
asset is interacting with female preschoolers only to significantly lower their CARs. 
Testing of restrictions of equality (in terms of CARi) between sexes of the same age 
group reveal that, controlling for all other things, CARi of male schoolers is significantly 
higher than that of female schoolers. When the impacts of husband’s and wife’s 
bargaining powers on various age-sex groups are examined it is found that bargaining 
powers differ significantly in their impacts on female preschoolers, thus rejecting the 
unitary hypothesis of household decision making. Also the impact of bargaining power 
is not always gender neutral as wife’s resources at marriage influence male schoolers 
and female schoolers significantly and differently with the latter enjoying a relative 
preference by the wife.25 
When it comes to individual good food share (GFi), good food availability at the 
household level (GFhh) influences it positively and significantly, as reflected in Annex 
Table A3 (column 3). Individual’s age is found to have a non-linear impact given the 
significance of both the level and the squared terms). However, a person’s activity level 
is negatively related to his/her good food share. This might imply when someone 
performs more demanding physical activities, s/he needs more calories which are 
perhaps taken from calorie-rich foods like cereals at a much greater portion. Also in 
female headed households, the proportion of individual energy generated from good 
food is higher. This is consistent with our previous findings where for male-headed 
households CARi were significantly higher implying that while male-headed households 
opt for calorie-rich foods, female headed households try to diversify their food basket 
by giving greater weight to some good foods which consequently reduce those 
households’ CARi as good foods are usually calorie-poor. All the age-sex categories 
except female preschoolers and female schoolers receive significantly higher proportion 
of their energy from preferred food items when comparison is drawn with male 
preschoolers, the benchmark category. However, neither the indicators of bargaining 
power, nor their interaction terms involving age-sex dummies exert any significant 
influence on GFi. Switching over to the restrictions we find that there is no discernible 
distinction between sexes of the same age-groups and unitary framework of household 
decision-making cannot be rejected owing to the absence of any significant different 
impacts of the two indicators of bargaining power on a particular age-sex category. 
Furthermore, the bargaining power indicators are gender neutral in their impacts as for 
no age-sex category those impacts are significantly different. 
Monthly food expenditure allocated to an individual is independent of the level of 
monthly per capita expenditure of the household providing evidence in support of the 
fact that food is a basic necessity (see Annex Table A3 column 4 for estimation results). 
Again, individual age is found to have a non-linear impact. Both household size and 
location (if urban) exercise significant positive influence on individual food 
expenditure. If the head of the household is a male, the food expenditure of a member is 
reduced significantly indicating that female heads allocate more resources to meet the 
members’ individual food requirement. Both the husband’s and wife’s assets at 
marriage and some of their interactions with individual age-sex dummies are 
individually significant. A significant higher amount is spent on male prime age adults 
compared to their female counterparts. Nonetheless, we cannot reject the unitary model 
                                                 
25  For F-statistics of all the restrictions see Annex Table A3.   14
and also the husband’s and wife’s resources at marriage are gender-neutral in their 
impacts.  
3.2  Female share of household income 
Table 3 exhibits the regression results of household calorie adequacy ratio and 
household good food share when the share in household income is used as the indicator 
of female status. Per capita household expenditure and household size influence CARhh 
and GFhh and household good food availability ratio positively and significantly. In 
some cases, household demographic composition is also an important determinant of the 
two dependent variables. Also, if the household lives in an urban locality, its good food 
availability is significantly higher relative to the ones in rural areas. However, the 
female share of household income fails to generate any significant influence in both the 
instances.  
Table 3: Impacts of female share of household income on household calorie adequacy ratio and 
household good food share: 2SLS estimates 
Dependent variable  Household calorie 
adequacy ratio 
Household good food 
share 
Variables   Coefficient  Coefficient 





Ln (household size)  0.165
*** (0.045) 0.055
*** (0.009) 
Household head’s sex (male = 1)  -0.031 (0.021)  -0.006 (0.004) 
Male schoolers in the household (ratio)   -0.055 (0.077)  -0.046
*** (0.015) 
Male young adults in the household (ratio)   -0.015 (0.067)  -0.001 (0.015) 
Male prime age adults in the household (ratio)  -0.135 (0.09)  0.018 (0.018) 
Male elderly in the household (ratio)   0.156 (0.106)  0.024 (0.023) 
Female preschoolers in the household (ratio)   0.118 (0.087)  0.028
* (0.016) 
Female schoolers in the household (ratio)   -0.111 (0.074)  -0.003 (0.017) 
Female young adults in the household (ratio)   0.067 (0.078)  -0.005 (0.017) 
Female prime age adults in the household 
(ratio)  
0.086 (0.082)  0.008 (0.018) 
Female elderly in the household (ratio)   0.337
*** (0.110) -0.006  (0.021) 
Female share of household income  -0.016 (0.035)  -0.004 (0.006) 
Location (urban = 1)  -0.024 (0.017)  0.007
* (0.004) 
Constant -2.34  (0.730)  0.924
*** (0.152) 




R-squared 0.0615  0.1081 
 




Drawn inferences are based on robust standard errors (given in the parentheses). For the household 
demographic composition of the households, male preschoolers are considered as the base excluded 
category.   15
Turning to the budget share regressions (Table 4), it is found that the share of household 
budget allocated to food is again significantly and nonlinearly influenced by 
household expenditure. The other significant determinants are household size and 
household demographic compositions. The female income share, on the other hand, is 
again unable to exhibit significant influence. In the case of the budget share to addictive 
goods, household size, household composition and location become the significant 
determinants. As people consume these goods from the force of habit, lack of 
significance of the household expenditure is explainable. Unlike the food budget share, 
there is now evidence of significantly negative effect of a rise in female share of 
household income on addictive consumption. When the budget share of eating outside 
home is considered, the similar effect of female share of household income is also 
found. 
Table 4: Different expenditure shares and female share of household income: 2SLS estimates 
Dependent variable   Budget share of 
food 
Budget share of 
addictive goods 
Budget share due to 
eating outside home 
Variables Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient 
Ln (per capita household expenditure), 
predicted 
-4.01
* (2.40)  0.271 (0.518)  -2.45 (1.54) 




* (0.166) -0.017  (0.036)  0.175
* (0.107) 
Ln (household size)  0.392
*** (0.034) 0.022
*** (0.007) 0.018  (0.017) 
Household head’s sex (male = 1)  0.007 (0.016)  -0.001 (0.003)  0.006 (0.007) 
Male schoolers in the household (ratio)   0.003 (0.055)  -0.008 (0.013)  -0.037 (0.026) 
Male young adults in the household (ratio)   0.204
*** (0.051)  0.011 (0.013)  -0.023 (0.025) 
Male prime age adults in the household 
(ratio)  
0.044 (0.069)  0.012 (0.016)  -0.035 (0.033) 
Male elderly in the household (ratio)   0.315
*** (0.099) 0.076
*** (0.021) -0.015  (0.039) 
Female preschoolers in the household (ratio)  -0.018 (0.060)  -0.006 (0.014)  0.048 (0.032) 
Female schoolers in the household (ratio)   0.063 (0.056)  0.013 (0.015)  -0.009 (0.031) 
Female young adults in the household (ratio)  0.072 (0.062)  0.002 (0.015)  -0.031 (0.028) 
Female prime age adults in the household 
(ratio) 
-0.132
** (0.067) -0.008  (0.014)  -0.061
* (0.028) 
Female elderly in the household (ratio)   0.100 (0.081)  -0.008 (0.016)  -0.043 (0.045) 
Location (urban = 1)  -0.002 (0.031)  0.007
*** (0.003) -0.003  (0.005) 
Female share of household income  -0.033 (0.027)  -0.018
*** (0.005) -0.021
* (0.011) 
Constant 12.64  (8.68)  -1.04 (1.85)  8.69 (5.49) 





R-squared 0.2214  0.073  0.0331 
 




Robust standard errors are given in the parentheses. Male preschoolers are the excluded category. 
Annex Table A4 contains the results of the three individual level regressions. Individual 
calorie adequacy ratio (CARi) is significantly determined by household calorie adequacy 
ratio (CARhh), household size, location, and individual activity level, and by various 
age-sex dummies. The interactive terms involving the female share of household 
income and female preschoolers, female schoolers, and male prime age adults are found 
to be significant and positively signed. This therefore provides evidence against the 
unitary approach to intra-household resource allocation. There is also some evidence of   16
gender discrimination as for male schoolers CARi is higher compared to their female 
counterparts, controlling for all other factors. However, the relative bargaining power of 
women is gender-neutral in its impact on other different age categories.  
The key determinants of individual good food share are the household good food 
availability, individual age and activity, household headship, location and individual 
age-sex dummies. Household good food availability appreciably raises the individual 
good food share. Individual age is found to have a non-linear impact as both the level 
and square terms are highly significant. For individuals with higher activity level the 
proportion of energy generated from preferred food items is lower. If the household 
head is a female, its members receive relatively more of their total calories from 
preferred foods. The impacts of a female’s relative bargaining power and its interaction 
terms are unable to yield any significant influence and hence the evidence is in favour 
of a unitary model. Within a household, there is some evidence of gender-based 
discrimination as a male prime age adult’s IGFS is significantly higher compared to his 
female counterpart. However the impact of female share of household income is gender-
neutral across various age categories. 
Monthly food expenditure of an individual is independent of the level of per capita 
expenditure of the household and is significantly affected by individual age, household 
size, household headship, location and individual age-sex dummies. The insignificance 
of household expenditure vindicates the fact that food is a basic necessity and the 
expenditure allocated to food is not significantly influenced by changes in the household 
expenditure. Again individual age exerts a non-linear impact as both the coefficients 
associated with the level and the square terms are significant. Female household heads 
allocate relatively more amounts to their individual members for defraying the food 
expenses. Again urban dwellers require significantly higher amounts for food relative to 
rural people. For female prime age adults and male elderly people, female share of 
household income appreciably lowers the individual food expenditures and thus yield 
support against the unitary model. There exists evidence of gender-based discrimination 
as significantly higher amounts are spent on male young adults, male prime age adults 
and male elderly, when compared to their corresponding female age categories. Also the 
impact of female’s relative bargaining power is not always gender neutral across the age 
categories as female elderly people are significantly favoured over their male 
counterparts.  
3.3  The composite index of women empowerment 
The final proxy that we use to reflect female status is a composite index of women 
empowerment. To avoid the potential problems of endogeneity associated with this 
composite index and to make it more representative of the social and cultural 
environment in which the women reside, the index is explained using a number of 
factors such as husband’s and wife’s education, presence of in-laws in the household, 
household’s socioeconomic status, strength of the wife’s network of relatives, her 
participation in income-generating activities, both off-home and in-house activities 
including participation in NGO programmes, economic status of the wife’s parents, and 
if the woman has other places, to live for a longer period in case of marriage breakage. 
Since socioeconomic status may not be captured well by mere income or expenditure of 
the household, to better apprehend the social, economic and other observed and 
unobserved cultural aspects determining it, two indices, namely, household asset index   17
and household status index are constructed, by using the methodology as outlined in 
Annex 2. We measure the strength of the wife’s network-of-relatives by total value of 
gifts that she received from her close relatives excluding the dowry, parental and own 
resources at the time of marriage. The underlying hypothesis is that a stronger network-
of-relatives may accentuate the status of the woman in her in-laws’ house.  
Following the regression results as provided in Annex Table A5, female empowerment 
index is found to be significantly and positively influenced by both wife’s education and 
husband’s education. The socioeconomic status of the household is also an important 
determinant of women empowerment as both household asset index and household 
status index exert significant positive influences on the empowerment index. Also, the 
stronger is the woman’s network-of-relatives, the higher is her empowerment. Her 
participation in income generating activities, both in-house and off-house, are 
individually significant having positive impacts on her empowerment. Again, if the 
woman participates in NGO activities, a significant higher value of the empowerment 
index is associated with her. However, the presence of mother-in-law within the 
household reduces her empowerment appreciably. To gauge the relative importance of 
comparable determinants of women empowerment a number of restrictions were tested. 
Based on the F-statistics of the restrictions, displayed in Annex Table A5, it can be said 
that the impact of the wife’s self education is significantly higher compared to the 
impact of her husband’s education, the status of the household is more important 
relative to the assets the household possesses and the woman’s participation in off-home 
earning activities raises her empowerment significantly in comparison with the 
influence of her participation in in-house earning activities.  
Table 5 displays the regression results of household calorie adequacy ratio and 
household good food share, using the empowerment index as the measure of female 
status. Like the previous cases, per capita expenditure, household size, location, and 
some demographic groups remain significant determinants of CARhh and GFhh and, 
urban households receive relatively more of their calories from preferred food items. 
The empowerment index fails to register statistical significance in calorie adequacy 
equation, but in the good food availability regression it turns out to be positive and 
highly significant.  
In budget share regressions, the results of which are reported in Table 6, the composite 
empowerment index is significant in the cases of food and eating-out regressions. 
Moving from one household to another, as women become more empowered, 
households tend to allocate more resources on food but less on eating out. In the case of 
additive goods equation although the sign of the index is negative, the effect is not 
statistically significant at the conventional levels.  
Annex Table A6 reports the individual level regressions. The sign and significance of 
most variables remain more of less unchanged in comparison with the two other 
indicators of female status used previously. The indicator of female empowerment and 
its interactions with individual age-sex dummies do not turn out to be significant in 
most cases. Nevertheless, some evidence of gender discrimination becomes evident as 
the restrictions on the equality of various male and female groups in terms of allocation 
of calories, good food share, and food expenditure, were rejected by the data. 
Particularly, male schoolers, male prime age adults and male elderly people are found to 
be treated more favourably compared to their female counterparts. On the other side,   18
female prime age adults and female elderly were considered to be over their 
corresponding male age categories. 
Individual good food share is positively and significantly determined by the 
corresponding household level outcome. Again individual age has a nonlinear impact 
whereas individual activity is negatively associated with his/her proportion of calories 
generated from good food. Also for an urban resident the good food share is 
significantly lower compared to a rural individual. The age-sex dummies are not 
individually significant, nor the female status and its interaction terms. We cannot reject 
the unitary model here. However, there is evidence of discrimination as for male prime 
age adults the ratio is significantly higher compared to female prime age adults. 
Additionally, female status is gender neutral in its impacts across various age groups. 
 
Table 5: Impacts of female empowerment on household calorie adequacy ratio and household 
good food share: 2SLS estimates 
Dependent variable  Household calorie 
adequacy ratio 
Household good food 
availability ratio 
Variables   Coefficient  Coefficient 











Household head’s sex (male = 1)  -0.031 (0.021)  -0.005 (0.004) 
Male schoolers in the household (ratio)   -0.064 (0.079)  -0.048
*** (0.015)
 
Male young adults in the household (ratio)   -0.024 (0.068)  -0.002 (0.015) 




  0.013 (0.018) 
Male elderly in the household (ratio)   0.142 (0.109)  0.032 (0.023) 
Female preschoolers in the household 
(ratio)  
0.104 (0.089)  -0.025 (0.016) 
Female schoolers in the household (ratio)   -0.112 (0.076)  -0.010 (0.017) 
Female young adults in the household (ratio) 0.052 (0.079)  -0.013 (0.017) 
Female prime age adults in the household 
(ratio) 
0.068 (0.081)  -0.002 (0.018) 
Female elderly in the household (ratio)  0.315
*** (0.113)
  -0.006 (0.020) 
Ln female empowerment index (predicted) -0.022  (0.041)  0.049
*** (0.008)
 












R-squared 0.0562  0.1349 
 




respectively. Drawn inferences are based on robust standard errors (given in the parentheses). 
Male preschoolers are the excluded category.   19
Table 6: Different expenditure shares and female empowerment: 2SLS estimates 





Budget share due to 
eating outside the 
home 
Variables Coefficient  Coefficient Coefficient 
Ln (per capita household expenditure), 
predicted 
-3.91 (2.71)  0.126 (0.546)  -1.16 
[Ln (per capita household expenditure), 
predicted]
2 
0.298 (0.188)  -0.006 (0.038)  0.087 





Household head’s sex (male = 1)  0.008 (0.015)  0.002 (0.003)  0.007 
Male schoolers in the household (ratio)   -0.003 (0.056)  -0.007 (0.013)  -0.038 
Male young adults in the household (ratio)  0.209
*** (0.051)
  0.013 (0.013)  -0.020 
Male prime age adults in the household 
(ratio)  
0.052 (0.068)  0.026
* (0.016) -0.017 
Male elderly in the household (ratio)   0.374
*** (0.101)
  0.087
*** (0.002) -0.003 
Female preschoolers in the household (ratio)  -0.019 (0.061)  -0.005 (0.015)  0.039 
Female schoolers in the household (ratio)   0.061 (0.057)  -0.016 (0.015)  -0.011 
Female young adults in the household (ratio)  0.042 (0.062)  -0.001 (0.015)  -0.039 




  -0.018 (0.015)  -0.069
** 
Female elderly in the household (ratio)   -0.118 (0.082)  -0.019 (0.017)  -0.064 (0.044) 
Location (urban = 1)  0.005 (0.014)  0.005
* (0.003) -0.003 




  -0.009 (0.007)  -0.056
*** 
Constant 12.5  (9.77)  -0.607 (1.94)  3.95 (5.64) 





R-squared 0.2331  0.0700  0.0366 
 




Drawn inferences are based on robust standard errors (given in the parentheses). Male 
preschoolers are the excluded category. 
Individual food expenditure is significantly influenced by individual age (again the 
impact is nonlinear), household size, location (with urban people spending higher 
amounts) and individual age-sex categories. Over and above, women empowerment 
significantly raises individual expenditure and we can reject the unitary model in this 
instance. However the interactions of female status and individual age-sex dummies are 
unable to produce any noteworthy impact. The phenomenon of gender discrimination is 
evident here as significantly higher amounts are allocated to female young adults and 
male prime age adults relative to their corresponding female age category. Again the 
impact of female status is independent of the sex of the individual across different age 
categories.  
Female status: related issues and its implications for gender discrimination 
From the regression results there is evidence that female status matter for food security. 
When husband’s and wife’s assets at marriage are taken as the indicator of their relative 
bargaining power, only in one instance (in the regression of individual calorie adequacy   20
ratio), the impacts of husband’s and wife’s marital assets on female preschoolers differ, 
yielding an evidence against the unitary model.  
If female share of household income is taken as a proxy for her relative bargaining 
power (her status), the budget share of addictive goods as well as the budget share of 
eating out practice is reduced significantly because of improved female status. Also in 
the regression of individual calorie adequacy ratio (for female preschoolers, female 
schoolers and male prime age adults) and in the individual food expenditure regression 
(for female prime age adults and male elderly) the impact of female status is 
significantly discernible.  
When the composite indicator of female status is used, its impacts on household good 
food share, budget share of food and individual food expenditure were significantly 
positive while for budget share of eating out practice the impact was negative and 
significant – all the impacts being desirable. However in none of the instances female 
status played any important role on the household calorie adequacy ratio as well as on 
individual good food share.  
Table 7: Impact of female status: the significant impacts 
Asset at marriage  Dependent 






HHCAR  ―  ―  ―  ―  ― 
HHGFS +**  +**  ―  ― +*** 
BS of food  ―  ―  ―  ― +*** 
BS of addictive 
goods 
  ―*   ―***  
BS of eating out  ―**  ―**  ―  ―*  ―*** 






male prime age 
adults*) 
― 
Individual GFS  ―  ―  ―  ―  ― 
Individual food 
expenditure 





Note: ‘+’ and ‘-’ indicate the sign of relationship. Statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 per cent 
level are denoted by *, ** and *** respectively. ‘―’ implies that no significant relation was found. 
Table 7 elucidates another interesting and important point – inferences drawn about 
food budget shares or about food expenditure on the basis of findings regarding 
addictive goods consumption (which are exclusively consumed by adults), may not 
always be true. Our findings show that though budget share of addictive goods is 
significantly lowered by female income share, budget share of food or individual food 
expenditure is not necessarily (appreciably) increased. Also though the index of female 
empowerment significantly raises food budget share as well as individual food 
expenditure, the index is unable to produce any significant impact on the budget share 
of addictive goods.   21
Table 8: Evidence of gender discrimination 
  Asset at 
marriage 




Individual CAR  Male schoolers  Male schoolers  Male schoolers 
Male prime age adults 
Male elderly 
Individual GFS  ―  Male prime age adults  Male prime age adults 
Individual food 
expenditure 
Male elderly  Male young adults 
Male prime age adults 
Male elderly 
Male young adults 
Male prime age adults 
 
Note: The name of the favoured age-sex category is given. ‘―’ implies that no discrimination 
was found. 
Table 9: Gender biasedness of female status: the favoured age-sex category 
  Asset at marriage  Female share of 
household income 
Indicator of female status 
Individual CAR  Female schoolers  ―  Female prime age adults 
Female elderly  
Individual GFS  ―  ―  ― 
Individual food 
expenditure 
―  Female elderly   ― 
 
Note: The age-sex category that is favoured by female status relative to their comparable 
counterpart is mentioned above. ‘―’ implies that female status was gender neutral in its 
impacts. 
Following Table 8, regardless of the proxy for female status used, there is evidence of 
gender discrimination. When asset brought at marriage is the proxy for female status, 
within a household male schoolers are in a better position compared to female schoolers 
in terms of calorie adequacy ratio and male elderly are favoured over female elderly in 
terms of food expenditure. When female share of household income is the proxy for 
female status, within a household male schoolers are in a better position relative to 
female schoolers in terms of calorie adequacy ratio; male prime age adults are favoured 
over female prime age adults in terms of good food share; male young adults, male 
prime age adults and male elderly are in a better position compared to their respective 
female counterparts in terms of the allocation of food expenditure. When the composite 
women empowerment index is used male schoolers, male prime age adults and male 
elderly enjoy a better position relative to their female counterparts in terms of calorie 
adequacy ratio; male prime age adults are favoured in terms of good food share; male 
young adults and male prime age adults are favoured in terms of the allocation of food 
expenditure. The noteworthy point here is that in all the instances males are favoured.  
Table 9 portrays the gender biasedness of female status as it reports the age-sex 
category that is favoured by female status in a particular context. A comparison between 
Tables 8 and 9 reveals that in the regression of individual calorie adequacy ratio, when 
asset at marriage is the proxy, female status favours female schoolers who are the 
disadvantaged people in this instance. Female share of household income favours 
female elderly in terms of individual food expenditure and they are one of the 
disadvantaged categories. When the composite empowerment index is considered, it is   22
found that in terms of individual calorie adequacy ratio the discrimination is against 
female schoolers, female prime age adults and female elderly people. But female status 
in this case favours female prime age adults and female elderly, two of the three 
disadvantaged groups, over their male counterparts. So the apparent discrimination 
against females of various age categories can be mitigated to a considerable extent by 
improving female status.  
4 Conclusion 
In this paper the main objective was to examine the relationship between women’s 
status and food security. The data of this paper comes from a random, representative 
and intra-household survey of Bangladeshi households, which provides individual level 
information on dietary intake as well as individual time-allocation to activities of 
different energy-intensities. Besides, the survey provides detailed information on 
individual and household expenditures and on various factors related to a married 
women’s within household status. 
The paper has contributed to the existing literature in a number of areas. First, it 
analysed both individual and household food security. Second, it considered two 
different measures of female bargaining power and a composite index of women 
empowerment as indicators of women status. Third, along with the budget shares of 
food and addictive goods the paper also considered the budget share due to the practice 
of eating outside home. Fourth, it went beyond the conventional budget share approach 
by considering calorie adequacy ratio, good food share and individual food expenditure.  
Regardless of the proxy used, there is the evidence of female status influencing intra-
household food distribution, which suggests that the common preference approach is 
inefficient in modeling intra-household resource distribution patterns. In certain 
instances female status was also found to reduce some unnecessary spending behaviours 
(allocation to addictive goods or eating out practice). But it was not mandatory that 
those saved resources would be channeled through food expenses. However among the 
three indicators employed, assets brought at marriage perform rather poorly which in 
turn substantiates the fact that in the context of Bangladesh it is not perhaps a good 
proxy for female status compared to female share of household income or an indicator 
of women empowerment.26 
The incidence of gender-based discrimination was also evident and in all the cases 
where discrimination was present, it was against females. Women’s status was found to 
be favouring some of those disadvantaged groups implying that increased female status 
could help mitigate the extent of gender-based discrimination. Findings of this paper 
                                                 
26  Marriage, as argued by Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003), is certainly one of the occasions of an 
individual’s lifetime when asset is transferred. But it is probably less significant when compared to the 
other occasion of asset transference, death. As a result one’s assets at marriage are likely to give poor 
signal of his/her bargaining power. Moreover, the claimed ‘symbolic meaning’ of assets at marriage ‘over 
and above their economic value’ is probably overstated (though Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003, argued 
the opposite, that is very unlikely to happen to be the case in Bangladesh). There are many other factors 
that can explain the economic value as well as the cultural relevance of a proxy for female status more 
directly (like female income share or especially the composite empowerment index). Also, assets at 
marriage entail valuation of assets that were transferred in distant past; the reporting may not be accurate 
and are unlikely to be adjusted for changes in price levels.    23
also seemed to suggest that a statistically significant positive influence of women’s 
status on food budget shares did not necessarily imply a similar opposite effect on all 
types of non-food expenditures. Therefore, inferences drawn about food security by 
analyzing the effect of women’s status solely on certain types of non-food budget shares 
(for example, addictive goods) could be misleading or overemphasized. 
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Annex 1 
Annex Table A1: Determinants of monthly per capita expenditure of the household 
Dependent variable                 Ln (monthly per capita expenditure of the household) 
Variables   Coefficient  Robust standard errors 
Ln (household landholding)  0.008*  0.004 
Ln (household head’s age)  0.013  0.022 
Ln (household size)  -0.393***  0.037 
Ln (household head’s education)   0.042***  0.008 
Household head’s sex (male = 1)  -0.010  0.026 
Location (urban = 1)  0.104***  0.020 
Ln (price of rice)   0.145**  0.064 
Ln (price of wheat)   -0.001  0.076 
Ln (price of fish)   -0.075*  0.044 
Ln (price of egg)  0.078  0.052 
Ln (price of meat)   0.025  0.035 
Ln (price of sugar)   0.048  0.034 
Ln (price of pulse)   0.131**  0.066 
Constant   6.42***  0.396 




Note: Statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 per cent level are denoted by *, ** and *** respectively. 
Drawn inferences are based on robust standard errors.  
Annex Table A2: Determinants of husband’s and wife’s resources at marriage 
Dependent variable  Ln (husband’s 
asset brought at 
marriage) 
Ln (wife’s asset 
brought at 
marriage) 
Variables Coefficient  Coefficient 
Ln (wife’s age at marriage)  0.090* (0.055)  0.096** (0.042) 
[Ln (wife’s age at marriage)]2  -0.002* (0.001)  -0.002** (0.001) 
Ln (husband’s age at marriage)  -2.60*** (0.794)  -0.376 (0.540) 
[Ln (husband’s age at marriage)]2  0.632*** (0.207)  0.055 (0.139) 
Ln (wife’s education)  0.671*** (0.168)  0.441*** (0.119) 
Ln (husband’s education)  0.275* (0.156)  0.147 (0.110) 
Average education of husband’s parents  -0.350 (0.268)  0.170** (0.069) 
Average education of wife’s parents  -0.504 (0.589)  0.003 (0.067) 
Ln (wife’s parents’ landholding)   0.697*** (0.096)  0.265*** (0.064) 
Ln (husband’s parents’ landholding)   0.353 (0.286)  0.111 (0.070) 
Location (urban = 1)  -0.137 (0.260)  0.559*** (0.165) 
Constant  8.09*** (0.346)  7.61*** (0.263) 
Number of observations  1039  1039 
F-statistics 6.11***  8.58*** 
R-squared 0.0614  0.0841 
 
Note: Statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 per cent level are denoted by *, ** and *** respectively. 
Drawn inferences are based on robust standard errors (given in the parentheses).    26
Annex Table A3: Impacts of marital assets on individual food security, individual good food 










Variables Coefficient  Coefficient Coefficient 
Household calorie adequacy ratio, 
fitted values  
0.610*** (0.086)     
Household good food availability ratio, 
fitted values 
 1.18***  (0.099)   
Ln (monthly per capita household 
expenditure), predicted 
   -5.45  (3.69) 
[Ln (monthly per capita household 
expenditure), predicted]2 
   0.401  (0.258) 
Ln (individual age)  -0.073 (0.056)  -0.124*** (0.019)  0.459*** (0.074) 
[Ln (individual age)]2  0.011 (0.009)  0.019*** (0.003)  -0.044*** (0.013) 
Ln (individual activity level)  -0.735*** (0.022)  -0.025*** (0.005)  -0.020 (0.037) 
Ln (household size)  0.025* (0.014)  0.0001 (0.003)  0.113*** (0.027) 
Household head’s sex (male = 1)  0.031** (0.014)  -0.006** (0.003)  -0.038* (0.023) 
Location (urban = 1)  -0.031*** (0.011)  -0.004 (0.003)  0.153*** (0.019) 
Individual age-sex dummy       
Male schoolers  0.634** (0.265)  0.155* (0.090)  0.975** (0.409) 
Male young adults  0.463* (0.259)  0.198** (0.089)  1.43*** (0.415) 
Male prime age adults  0.468* (0.251)  0.211** (0.087)  1.16*** (0.388) 
Male elderly  1.18*** (0.398)  0.208** (0.094)  1.69*** (0.522) 
Female preschoolers  -0.011 (0.322)  0.126 (0.113)  0.552 (0.462) 
Female schoolers  0.339 (0.258)  0.135 (0.090)  0.647 (0.408) 
Female young adults  0.238 (0.274)  0.221** (0.090)  0.951** (0.440) 
Female prime age adults  0.389 (0.246)  0.179** (0.087)  0.788** (0.385) 
Female elderly  0.671 (0.479)  0.288*** (0.093)  2.13*** (0.592) 
Bargaining power and interaction terms       
Ln (wife’s asset at marriage)  0.006 (0.038)  0.007 (0.014)  0.093* (0.057) 
Ln (husband’s asset at marriage)  0.004 (0.027)  0.009 (0.009)  0.084** (0.043) 
Wife’s asset at marriage * female 
preschoolers 
0.081 (0.053)  -0.019 (0.019)  -0.072 (0.079) 
Wife’s asset at marriage * male 
schoolers 
-0.064 (0.041)  -0.005 (0.014)  -0.133** (0.066) 
Wife’s asset at marriage * female 
schoolers 
0.003 (0.043)  -0.004 (0.015)  -0.081 (0.068) 
Wife’s asset at marriage * male young 
adults 
-0.025 (0.041)  -0.009 (0.014)  -0.133** (0.066) 
Wife’s asset at marriage * female 
young adults 
0.006 (0.041)  -0.013 (0.014)  -0.120* (0.066) 
Wife’s asset at marriage * male prime 
age adults 
-0.003 (0.039)  -0.008 (0.014)  -0.067 (0.062) 
Wife’s asset at marriage * female 
prime age adults  
-0.019 (0.039)  -0.008 (0.014)  -0.089 (0.062) 
Wife’s asset at marriage * male elderly  -0.069 (0.059)  -0.011 (0.015)  -0.145* (0.077) 
Wife’s asset at marriage * female 
elderly 
-0.019 (0.065)  -0.019 (0.015)  -0.174** (0.080) 
Husband’s asset at marriage * female 
preschoolers 











Variables Coefficient  Coefficient Coefficient 
Husband’s asset at marriage * male 
schoolers 
0.003 (0.030)  -0.011 (0.009)  0.026 (0.049) 
Husband’s asset at marriage * female 
schoolers 
-0.033 (0.034)  -0.010 (0.010)  0.006 (0.054) 
Husband’s asset at marriage * male 
young adults 
-0.014 (0.029)  -0.011 (0.009)  -0.004 (0.049) 
Husband’s asset at marriage * female 
young adults 
-0.018 (0.030)  -0.010 (0.009)  0.018 (0.051) 
Husband’s asset at marriage * male 
prime age adults 
-0.029 (0.028)  -0.013 (0.009)  -0.035 (0.046) 
Husband’s asset at marriage * female 
prime age adults  
-0.006 (0.028)  -0.011 (0.009)  -0.003 (0.046) 
Husband’s asset at marriage * male 
elderly 
-0.038 (0.048)  -0.011 (0.010)  -0.029 (0.062) 
Husband’s asset at marriage * female 
elderly 
-0.037 (0.048)  -0.013 (0.010)  -0.094 (0.059) 
Constant  0.615** (0.261)  0.046 (0.088)  22.1* (13.2) 
Number of observations   4859  4859  4859 
F-statistics 44.16***  19.30***  54.56*** 
R-squared 0.2191  0.2124  0.3163 
F-statistics of the restrictions        
Male schoolers = female schoolers  2.75*  0.21  1.14 
Male young adults = female young 
adults 
1.37 0.35  1.87 
Male prime age adults = female prime 
age adults 
0.37 1.68  2.78* 
Male elderly = female elderly  0.93  2.27  0.51 
Husband’s asset at marriage = wife’s 
asset at marriage 
0.00 0.01  0.01 
Husband’s asset at marriage * male 
schoolers = wife’s asset at marriage * 
male schoolers 
1.01 0.08  2.21 
Husband’s asset at marriage * male 
young adults = wife’s asset at marriage 
* male young adults 
0.03 0.01  1.49 
Husband’s asset at marriage * male 
prime age adults = wife’s asset at 
marriage * male prime age adults 
0.18 0.04  0.10 
Husband’s asset at marriage * male 
elderly = wife’s asset at marriage * 
male elderly 
0.10 0.00  0.83 
Husband’s asset at marriage * female 
preschoolers = wife’s asset at marriage 
* female preschoolers  
3.29* 0.60  0.35 
Husband’s asset at marriage * female 
schoolers = wife’s asset at marriage * 
female schoolers 
0.24 0.07  0.60 
Husband’s asset at marriage * female 
young adults = wife’s asset at marriage 
* female young adults 











Variables Coefficient  Coefficient Coefficient 
Husband’s asset at marriage * female 
prime age adults = wife’s asset at 
marriage * female prime age adults 
0.04 0.02  0.74 
Husband’s asset at marriage * female 
elderly = wife’s asset at marriage * 
female elderly  
0.03 0.06  0.42 
Husband’s asset at marriage * male 
schoolers = husband’s asset at 
marriage * female schoolers 
1.79 0.03  0.22 
Husband’s asset at marriage * male 
young adults = husband’s asset at 
marriage * female young adults 
0.04 0.10  0.34 
Husband’s asset at marriage * male 
prime age adults = husband’s asset at 
marriage * female prime age adults 
2.47 0.34  1.59 
Husband’s asset at marriage * male 
elderly = husband’s asset at marriage * 
female elderly 
0.00 0.11  1.15 
Wife’s asset at marriage * male 
schoolers = wife’s asset at marriage * 
female schoolers 
4.72** 0.02 1.08 
Wife’s asset at marriage * male young 
adults = wife’s asset at marriage * 
female young adults 
1.47 0.60  0.08 
Wife’s asset at marriage * male prime 
age adults = wife’s asset at marriage * 
female prime age adults 
0.68 0.03  0.43 
Wife’s asset at marriage * male elderly 
= wife’s asset at marriage * female 
elderly 
0.50 1.19  0.14 
 
Note: Statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 per cent level are denoted by *, ** and *** 
respectively. Drawn inferences are based on robust standard errors (given in the parentheses). 
Male preschoolers are the excluded category.    29
Annex Table A4: Impacts of female share of household income on individual food security, 










Variables Coefficient Coefficient   
Household calorie adequacy ratio, 
predicted  
0.527*** (0.083)     
Household good food availability 
ratio, predicted 
 1.13***  (0.074)   
Ln (per capita household 
expenditure), predicted 
   -828  (3.70) 
[Ln (per capita household 
expenditure), predicted]2 
   0.0877  (0.258) 
Ln (individual age)  -0.076 (0.056)  -0.126*** (0.019)  0.445*** (0.076) 
[Ln (individual age)]2  0.012 (0.009)  0.019*** (0.003)  -0.041*** (0.013) 
Ln (individual activity level)  -0.716*** (0.020)  -0.027*** (0.005)  -0.060 (0.037) 
Ln (household size)  0.024* (0.014)  -0.001 (0.003)  0.113*** (0.028) 
Household head’s sex (male = 1)  0.016 (0.015)  -0.007** (0.003)  -0.053** (0.027) 
Location (urban = 1)  -0.032*** (0.008)  -0.004* (0.002)  0.133*** (0.015) 
Individual age-sex dummy       
Male schoolers  0.097*** (0.034)  0.018* (0.011)  0.048 (0.055) 
Male young adults  0.119*** (0.039)  0.024* (0.012)  0.253*** (0.065) 
Male prime age adults  0.163*** (0.046)  0.031** (0.013)  0.301*** (0.077) 
Male elderly  0.242*** (0.063)  0.019 (0.013)  0.225** (0.099) 
Female preschoolers  -0.006 (0.034)  -0.013 (0.011)  -0.032 (0.052) 
Female schoolers  0.053 (0.033)  0.013 (0.011)  0.021 (0.054) 
Female young adults  0.126*** (0.041)  0.020 (0.012)  0.085 (0.066) 
Female prime age adults  0.161*** (0.045)  0.018 (0.013)  0.015 (0.074) 
Female elderly  0.167*** (0.064)  0.010 (0.013)  -0.208** (0.103) 
Bargaining power and interaction 
terms 
    
Female share of household income  -0.118 (0.077)  0.004 (0.026)  0.092 (0.161) 
Female share of household income * 
female preschoolers 
0.286** (0.139)  -0.015 (0.038)  -0.068 (0.212) 
Female share of household income * 
male schoolers 
0.134 (0.088)  -0.020 (0.027)  -0.177 (0.172) 
Female share of household income * 
female schoolers 
0.197** (0.094)  -0.006 (0.028)  -0.236 (0.181) 
Female share of household income * 
male young adults 
0.093 (0.09)  -0.001 (0.027)  -0.087 (0.178) 
Female share of household income * 
female young adults 
0.099 (0.087)  -0.002 (0.027)  -0.221 (0.178) 
Female share of household income * 
male prime age adults 
0.153* (0.092)  -0.011 (0.027)  -0.249 (0.176) 
Female share of household income * 
Female prime age adults 












Variables Coefficient Coefficient   
Female share of household income * 
male elderly 
0.117 (0.155)  -0.001 (0.034)  -0.428* (0.231) 
Female share of household income * 
female elderly 
0.153 (0.126)  -0.006 (0.029)  0.061 (0.204) 
Constant  0.801*** 
(0.112) 
0.191*** (0.023)  6.69 (13.2) 
Number of observations  4859  4859  4859 
F-statistics 59.83***  21.47***  67.11*** 
R-squared 0.2118  0.1930  0.2966 
F-statistics of the restrictions       
Male schoolers = Female schoolers  6.31***  1.95  0.74 
Male young adults = female young 
adults 
0.16 1.3 23.09*** 
Male prime age adults = female prime 
age adults 
0.03 27.8***  147.09*** 
Male elderly = female elderly  2.14  2.02  41.07*** 
Female share of household income * 
male schoolers = female share of 
household Income * female schoolers 
0.79 1.02  0.30 
Female share of household income * 
male young adults = female share of 
household income * female young 
adults 
0.01 0.01  1.38 
Female share of household income * 
male prime age adults = female share 
of household income * female prime 
age adults 
1.92 0.15  0.17 
Female share of household income * 
male elderly = female share of 
household income * female elderly 
0.04 0.03  5.41** 
 
Note: Statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 per cent level are denoted by *, ** and *** 
respectively. Drawn inferences are based on robust standard errors (given in the parentheses). 
Male preschoolers are the excluded category.    31
Annex Table A5: Determinants of the composite index of women empowerment 
Dependent variable: in (composite index of women empowerment) 
Variables Coefficient  Robust  standard 
errors 
Ln (husband’s education + 1)   0.018*  0.001 
Ln (wife’s education + 1)  0.072***  0.012 
Ln (household asset index + 1)  0.048***  0.017 
Ln (household status index + 1)  0.117***  0.033 
Ln (strength of the wife’s network of relatives)  0.009***  0.003 
Participation in outside-home earning activities (1 if yes)  0.209***  0.022 
Participation in within-home earning activities (1 if yes)  0.059***  0.020 
If mother-in-law is staying with the family (1 if yes)   -0.208***  0.041 
If father-in-law is staying with the family (1 if yes)  -0.052  0.093 
If the woman participates in NGO activities  0.063***  0.022 
If the woman has places other than the husband’s home 
to stay for a long time (1 if yes) 
0.019 0.021 
If the wife’s parents are richer now (1 if yes)   -0.018  0.022 
Constant 0.727***  0.042 
Number of observations  1000 
F-statistics 27.64*** 
R-squared 0.2419 
F-statistics of restrictions   
Test wife’s education = husband’s education  9.44*** 
Test household asset index = household status index  2.67* 
Test participation in outside-home earning activities = 
participation in within-home earning activities  
23.02*** 
 
Note: Statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 per cent level are denoted by *, ** and *** 
respectively. Drawn inferences are based on robust standard errors. 
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Annex Table A6: Impacts of female empowerment on individual food security, individual good 







Ln individual food 
expenditure (monthly) 
Variables Coefficient Coefficient   
Household calorie adequacy 
ratio, predicted  
0.563*** (0.089)     
Household good food 
availability ratio, predicted 
 1.18***  (0.094)   
Ln (per capita household 
expenditure), predicted 
   0.221  (3.35) 
[Ln (per capita household 
expenditure), predicted] 2 
   0.004  (0.233) 
Ln (individual age)  -0.110* (0.057)  -0.128*** (0.020)  0.421*** (0.078) 
[Ln (individual age)] 2  0.018* (0.009)  0.019*** (0.003)  -0.036*** (0.014) 
Ln (individual activity level)  -0.728*** (0.021)  -0.027*** (0.005)  -0.007 (0.038) 
Ln (household size)  0.024* (0.014)  0.001 (0.003)  0.124*** (0.027) 
Household head’s sex 
(male = 1) 
0.018 (0.013)  -0.003 (0.003)  0.003 (0.002) 
Location (urban = 1)  -0.027*** (0.008)  -0.004* (0.002)  0.127*** (0.015) 
Individual age-sex dummy       
Male schoolers  0.190 (0.161)  -0.004 (0.056)  0.129 (0.234) 
Male young adults  0.120 (0.160)  0.009 (0.057)  0.314 (0.243) 
Male prime age adults  0.260* (0.156)  0.048 (0.056)  0.471** (0.231) 
Male elderly  0.568** (0.284)  0.001 (0.062)  0.348 (0.375) 
Female preschoolers  -0.129 (0.192)  -0.029 (0.067)  -0.165 (0.278) 
Female schoolers  0.023 (0.155)  -0.012 (0.056)  -0.021 (0.242) 
Female young adults  -0.007 (0.164)  0.026 (0.057)  -0.025 (0.257) 
Female prime age adults  0.121 (0.157)  0.018 (0.056)  0.103 (0.231) 
Female elderly  -0.088 (0.262)  0.013 (0.061)  -0.255 (0.361) 
Bargaining power and 
interaction terms 
    
Ln (indicator of female status), 
fitted values 
-0.114 (0.119)  -0.016 (0.046)  0.594*** (0.173) 
Female status * female 
preschoolers 
0.132 (0.167)  0.013 (0.057)  0.115 (0.239) 
Female status * male schoolers  -0.058 (0.134)  0.019 (0.046)  -0.085 (0.198) 
Female status * female 
schoolers 
0.058 (0.130)  0.022 (0.046)  0.008 (0.206) 
Female status * male young 
adults 
0.024 (0.133)  0.013 (0.047)  -0.066 (0.203) 
Female status * female young 
adults 
0.138 (0.136)  -0.004 (0.046)  0.074 (0.216) 
Female status * male prime age 
adults 
-0.052 (0.127)  -0.016 (0.046)  -0.178 (0.189) 
Female status * female prime 
age adults 
0.057 (0.128)  -0.001 (0.045)  -0.112 (0.189) 
Female status * male elderly  -0.268 (0.244)  0.013 (0.052)  -0.137 (0.325) 
Female status * female elderly  0.254 (0.229)  -0.005 (0.051)  0.086 (0.309) 
Constant  0.925*** (0.177)  0.204*** (0.059)  2.71 (12.0) 








Ln individual food 
expenditure (monthly) 
Variables Coefficient Coefficient   
F-statistics 56.48***  26.84***  72.82*** 
R-squared 0.2134  0.2011  0.3191 
F-statistics of the restrictions        
Male schoolers = female schoolers  2.91*  0.16  0.76 
Male young adults = female young 
adults 
1.53 0.64  2.91* 
Male prime age adults = female prime 
age adults 
3.45* 5.05**  7.96*** 
Male elderly = female elderly  4.12**  0.11  2.09 
Female status * male schoolers = 
female status * female schoolers 
2.06 0.04  0.39 
Female status * male young adults = 
female status * female young adults 
1.70 0.91  0.67 
Female status * male prime age adults 
= female status * female prime age 
adults 
2.93* 1.76  0.36 
Female status * male elderly = female 
status * female elderly 
3.25* 0.28  0.35 
 
Note: Statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 per cent level are denoted by *, ** and *** 
respectively. Drawn inferences are based on robust standard errors (given in the parentheses). 
Male preschoolers are the excluded category.    34
Annex 2 
Calculating individual calorie requirements 
It is desirable that an individual should get the expended energy per unit of time (per, 
day for convenience) to maintain existing health. Broadly, total energy expenditure of 
an individual includes expenditure at rest and during physical activity. The values of 
these two components depend on individual-specific factors like age, sex, body weight 
and composition, physiologic state (for example, growth, pregnancy, lactation) and on 
some natural factors. Resting energy expenditure (REE) is the starting point in 
measuring calorie requirements and is defined as the energy expended by an individual 
at rest under thermally neutral conditions. Basal Metabolic Rate (BMR) is defined to be 
the REE soon after awakening in the morning measured at least 12 hours from the last 
meal. In practice the variation in measured REE and BMR is very low and in literatures 
these two terms are used interchangeably. 
Generally, REE is the largest component of calorie requirements if physical activity is 
not too great. It depends largely on physical characteristics like weight, height, sex and 
age. In the literature REE is measured using several empirically derived equations. In 
this paper we have used the equations from the WHO (1985), which are given below. 
Annex Table A7: Equations for predicting resting energy expenditure from body weight
a 
Sex and age range 
(years) 
Equation to derive 




Males      
0-3 (60.9  x  wt
c) - 54  0.97  53 
3-10  (22.7 x wt) + 495  0.86  62 
10-18  (17.5 x wt) + 651  0.90  100 
18-30  (15.3 x wt) + 679  0.65  151 
30-60  (11.6 x wt) + 879  0.60  164 
>60  (13.5 x wt) + 487  0.79  148 
Females      
0-3  (61.9 x wt) - 51  0.97  61 
3-10  (22.5 x wt) + 499  0.85  63 
10-18  (12.2 x wt) + 746  0.75  117 
18-30  (14.7 x wt) + 496  0.72  121 
30-60  (8.7 x wt) + 829  0.70  108 





a From WHO (1985). These equations were derived from BMR data. 
 
b Correlation coefficient (R) of reported BMRs and predicted values, and standard deviation (SD) 
of the differences between actual and computed values. 
 
c wt is weight of person in kilograms. 
 
Source: Adapted from WTO (1985). 
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The equations in Annex Table A7 provide approximated values of REE that are widely 
accepted. This set of equations does not include height as this variable was found not to 
be statistically significant in determining REE. 
Energy expenditure is largely influenced by the characteristics of physical activity, 
which can be of many sorts and of different intensities. Defining physical activity and 
its inclusion into the measurement of energy requirement is of immense importance as it 
is argued to be the second largest component of energy requirement (after rest). The 
traditional approach of defining physical activity by occupation categories is inadequate 
or not the closest approximation. This is because individuals perform different types of 
activities every day to fulfill the economic and social responsibilities and allocate time 
to maximize utility out of those activities. Different types of activity require different 
levels of energy expenditure and energy expenditure of a particular activity is an 
increasing function of time allocated to the activity. Thus, in measuring energy 
requirement one should incorporate not only activities but also the time allocation. As a 
result we have used a weighted average of activity factor where the categorization of 
activities and also the values of activity factor associated with each category are taken 
from NRC (1989) and the weights are the allocated time in each activity per day, which 
comes from the survey data. A total of 31 types of activities are considered in our study 
and they are then categorized into five categories namely resting, very light, light, 
moderate, and heavy according the intensity of energy expenditure as the names 
suggest. Table A1 is reproduced from NRC (1989) report with the activity types 
considered in each category in our study.  
Annex Table A8: Approximate energy expenditure for various activities in relation to resting 
needs for males and females of average size 
 
Activity category  Activity Representative  value  for 
factor per unit of activity 
Resting  Sleeping, eating, drinking  REE × 1.0 
Very light  Office work, work in own business, 
looking after crops, looking after poultry 
and livestock, social and political 
activity, others 
REE × 1.5 
Light  Collecting firewood, fishing, masonary, 
carpentry, weaving, handicrafts, 
walking, transportation, work at school, 
shopping, cooking, domestic work, 
washing clothes and dishes, looking 
after the children and elderly, playing 
games, religious activity 
REE × 2.5 
Moderate  Ploughing, weeding, fetching water, 
riding bicycle, boating, harvesting 
crops, leveling crop lands, throwing 
fertilizers in the fields, non-mechanical 
irrigation  
REE × 5.0 
Heavy  Earth digging, brick-breaking, carrying 
loads, rickshaw-van pulling 
REE × 7.0 
 
Source: NRC (1989). 
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To make the time allocation representative an average of three days is taken for each 
individual. The weighted average of the activity factor is then used as multiple of REE 
to get to the approximate value of energy requirement.  
Constructing the composite index of women’s empowerment 
The index is based on seven different indicators/indices. 
(1)  Earnings, savings and spending: we consider the following three questions, 
1.  Who takes the decision regarding the spending of women’s earnings? If the 
woman takes independent or joint decisions she is given a value of 1 and 0 if 
otherwise. 
2.  Whether she keeps some money for her own security or personal spending. 1 
for yes and 0 for no. 
3.  Whether the husband knows about this personal spending. 1 if the husband 
never knows and 0 otherwise. 
(2)  Ability to make purchases: we ask the woman if she can buy some listed goods 
and services. The list had 12 categories. For each kind of items, we ascribed 1 for 
always/sometimes and 0 if otherwise. All the answers were summed and then divided 
by 12. This index thus ranges from 0 to 1. 
(3)  Ability to take purchasing decision: regarding the purchase of those 12 items we 
inquired about the decision taker. For an independent (decision taken by the woman 
herself) or joint decision we give a 1 and a 0 if otherwise. In a similar fashion this index 
also lies between 0 and 1.  
(4)  Index of mobility: we categorize all the possible visiting places into 7 classes and 
ask the married women if she has visited those places in recent times. 1 is given for each 
yes and 0 for each no. The sum of all the responses is divided by 7. As a result we also 
have the mobility index in the ‘0 to 1’ range. 
(5)  Occurrence of degrading and abusive incidents: we considered the following 
unexpected events: 
1.  Whether husband or other family members have taken money against the 
woman’s will. 
2.  Whether husband or other family members have taken assets (land, jewellery, 
etc.) against the woman’s will. 
3.  The woman was not allowed to meet her parents. 
4.  Threats of divorce. 
5.  Threats of remarriage. 
6. Verbal  abuse. 
7. Physical  abuse  (beating). 
For the non-occurrence of each type of incident we ascribe a 1, and a 0 if that event has 
taken place. Dividing the sum of all the answers by 7 we get an index that ranges from 0 
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(6)  Index of political awareness: to assess the woman’s political awareness we ask 
the following: 
1.  Whether she knows the name of the local UP chairman (1 if yes and 0 
otherwise). 
2.  Whether she knows the name of the local MP (1 if yes and 0 otherwise). 
3.  Whether she knows the name of the PM of the country (1 if yes and 0 
otherwise). 
4.  Whether she has cast vote (1 if yes and 0 otherwise). 
5.  Whether she chose the candidate herself while casting vote (1 if yes and 0 
otherwise). 
This index, like the previous, are scaled between 0 and 1. 
(7) Nutritional  awareness: 10 questions were asked about nutrition and primary 
health care. If all the answers were correct the woman got 1. This index also ranges 
between 0 and 1. 
Note: For all the seven indices described above, we took one value for each household. 
In the case of households having a second married woman, we took the average of the 
two women’s indices. 
The composite index of women empowerment: We sum all those 7 indices for each 
woman to obtain the corresponding value of the ‘composite index of women 
empowerment’. This composite index is household specific and ranges from 0 to 7. 
Indicators of a household’s socioeconomic status 
Household asset index: The index of household asset is constructed based on 32 
different types of household belongings (goods and chattels).27 We ascribe 1 for the 
presence of each item and 0 for its absence and thus the index will assume a value 
between 0 and 32 for each household.  
Household status index: We construct another index to reflect the household’s 
socioeconomic status based on 4 indicators – whether the household has a separate 
kitchen, substance (brick/cement/rod/tin/wood/tiles/leaves) used to build the roof, if 
‘pucca’ latrine is used and whether supply/tube well water is the source of drinking 
water. The value of this index lies between 0 and 4.28 
                                                 
27  The goods are: radio, cassette player, camera, bicycle, motor cycle/scooter, motor car, refrigerator, 
washing machine, fan, oven (electric/gas), toaster, heater, television, VCR/VCP, dish antenna/decoder, 
cell phone, pressure lamp, sewing machine, tube well, wrist watch, wall clock, power tiller, tractor, 
threshing-machine, power pump, shallow tubewell, cattle, plough, insecticide spraying machine, 
generator, fishing materials (net, boat, trawler) and loom. 
28  A ‘yes’ answer related to three indicators was given a value of 1 each. In the materials used for roof, 
the use of brick, cement, and rod was given a value of 1, while for all other materials a value of 0 was 
assigned. 